Testimony

• The Honorable Patty Murray

Witness Panel 2

• Mr. Frank Kelty

• Mr. Dave Fraser

• Mr. Kevin Duffy
  Read statement

  Witness Panel 2

  Mr. Kevin Duffy

  Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am Kevin C. Duffy, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. I am also the State of Alaska’s representative on the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the North Pacific Fishery Management Council’s preferred alternative for the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Crab Rationalization Plan. Thirty years ago, foreign harvesters and processors prosecuted Bering Sea crab fisheries. Then, the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Act Americanized these fisheries. The U.S. industry started from scratch, investing in both harvesting and processing capacity. At the same time, Alaska communities invested in the labor and infrastructure to support these fisheries. The crab fisheries flourished, quickly becoming the most valuable fisheries in the North Pacific. Investments in all sectors grew together and soon there was too much capacity harvesting and processing declining stocks of crab. None of the three partners – harvesters, processors and communities – I currently consider financially healthy. Of particular concern to the State of Alaska are the remote fishery-dependent communities, which are now adversely impacted by the diminished flow of economic activity. Rationalization is the path to re-vitalize the economic health of these fisheries, provided the policy recognizes the partnership among harvesters, processors and communities. This partnership is like a three-legged stool. Cut out any leg and the stool tips over. The solution to keeping this stool strong and stable is to ensure that any rationalization program maintains the integrity of this partnership by providing incentives for all parties to work toward mutually beneficial goals. There are two approaches that accomplish this objective. The two approaches that maximize the benefits to the nation and equitably distribute these benefits among the three partners are the Voluntary Cooperatives and the Two Pie allocation of quota share, which in combination with the CDQ allocations and other community elements, is in reality a Three Pie allocation scheme. This Voluntary Three Pie Cooperative approach, approved by the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (hereafter referred to as the Council), recognizes the prior economic interests among harvesters, processors and communities. This three-pie approach fits the Bering Sea crab fishery. The Council has a pioneering history of designing rationalization programs unique to the fishery at hand. The Council crafted an IFQ program for halibut and sablefish that fit the small vessel, owner on-board nature of that fishery. For pollock, the mechanism was processor-linked cooperatives. We design rationalization programs to fit the dynamics and needs of the particular fishery. For the large boat, heavily industrialized, corporate nature of the BSAI crab fisheries, the Council found that a voluntary, three-pie cooperative structure fit best. Given the Council’s history, I fully expect a different model will emerge from the Council for the Gulf of Alaska rationalization process that is currently underway. I want to emphasize that conservation and safety are as much a driving force to rationalize as the need to re-vitalize the economic health of the industry and communities. Resource protection is imbedded within the Council’s plan. With extended, slower seasons it is anticipated that deadloss will be greatly reduced and that the already low bycatch will decline further. With more time to prosecute the fishery, fewer pots will be lost and ghost fishing by lost or abandoned pots will be reduced even beyond the low level that the current regulatory safeguards have resulted in. To ensure that the resource remains a paramount benefactor of rationalization, increased monitoring (with fees to support it) will occur. With voluntary cooperatives, the regulatory units will be smaller and hence administrators and resource managers will benefit as well. Furthermore, ending the ‘race for the fish’ builds a conservation safety net that the Board of Fisheries and the Department of Fish and Game will build and act upon. And most importantly, the Council’s plan saves lives. The current management scheme of the BSAI crab fisheries results in a derby-style “race for fish”. This system often puts pressure on participants to fish in unsafe weather conditions, work continuously for long periods without rest. There is also the potential to overload vessels with fishing gear in an attempt to improve returns under these conditions. Falling Guideline Harvest Levels (GHLs) and overcapacity in all crab fisheries has reduced fishing periods and increased the “race” for crab, thus exacerbating safety concerns for BSAI crab vessels. According to the 1997 and 2001 Occupational Safety and Health studies, the Alaskan commercial fishing industry had a fatality rate 28 times the national occupational average. Within this high-risk industry, the BSAI crab fisheries were found to account for a disproportionately high level of injuries and death. From 1990 to 2001, there were a total of 25 vessels lost, resulting in 40 fatalities. Twenty-one more lives were lost as a result of being swept overboard, crushed by crab pots or entangled in lines or winches. These losses are simply unacceptable. It is these losses that in part compelled the Council to act now and end the dangerous “race for fish.” Examining safety statistics in the Alaskan halibut fishery suggests that rationalization of that fishery has been a force in improving safety. In the five years preceding implementation of the halibut IFQ program (1990 to 1994), 17 fatalities occurred in the halibut fishery. In the 7 years after implementation of the program (1995 to 2001) the number of fatalities in the fishery declined to 4. While no one can predict the number of lives saved, it is anticipated that rationalizing BSAI crab, the most dangerous fishery in the U.S., will have a similar affect on reducing fatalities. It should also be noted that to the extent that a rationalized management system results in a sustainable, economically viable fishery, then improvements in safety should follow. In economically viable fisheries, harvesters are able to make a profit, and vessel owners are able to invest in better quality equipment, proper vessel maintenance, and hire, train and keep professional skippers and crews. All of these factors help improve safety. BACKGROUND ON THE COUNCIL PROCESS Congress directed the Council to consider a wide variety of approaches to a rationalized fishery. As part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-554), Congress directed the Council to examine fisheries under its jurisdiction to determine whether rationalization was needed. The specific legislative language is: The North Pacific Fishery Management Council shall examine the fisheries under its jurisdiction, particularly the Gulf of Alaska groundfish and Bering Sea crab fisheries, to determine whether rationalization is needed. In particular, the North Pacific Council shall analyze individual fishing quotas, processor quotas, cooperatives, and quotas held by communities. The analysis should include an economic analysis of the impact of all options on communities and processors as well as the fishing fleets. The North Pacific Council shall present its analysis to the appropriations and authorizing committees of the Senate and House of Representatives in a timely manner. Early in the rationalization process, the Council established a broad-based industry working group to develop options to rationalize the Bering Sea crab fisheries. This work group met over a two-year period to identify workable solutions and to develop a majority opinion. Including the work of the BSAI Crab Committee, the Council has studied this issue for well over three years, with a detailed analysis of all the issues brought forward by the Committee which included the concept of processor shares. Additionally, the Council held hearings in major ports and communities of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon. The first Council action was to unanimously adopt a problem statement that any solution should consider “the lack of economic stability for harvesters, processors and coastal communities”. Adopting this problem statement allowed for the detailed analysis of numerous options. To assist in our understanding of the impacts of the various options on all participants, we employed several specialists to work with Council staff. After several revisions and an exhaustive public review of the analysis the Council then unanimously adopted a final motion in June 2002, which responded to Congressional direction. Since then, the Council continued to work on several trailing amendments and completed its work on BSAI Crab Rationalization in April 2003. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE COUNCIL’S MOTION (includes trailing amendments) • Harvest shares will be allocated for 100 percent of the total allowable catch (TAC). The qualifying years selected for these shares were the years recommended by the BSAI Crab Committee and the Advisory Panel. • Processing shares will be allocated for 90 percent of the TAC. The qualifying years selected for these shares were the years recommended by the BSAI Crab Committee. • Regional share designations will apply to all processor shares and to the corresponding 90 percent harvest shares. The regional designation recognizes historic delivery patterns and distributes landings between two specific regions. • There is no linkage between harvest shares and processing shares. Harvesters are free, within regions, to match up shares with any processor that hold processing shares. Ten percent of the harvester’s allocation will remain available to deliver to any processor (called B shares) whether or not that processor was eligible to receive an initial allocation of processing shares. • Voluntary harvester cooperatives are encouraged and once formed should achieve efficiencies through the coordination of harvest activities and deliveries to processors. It is anticipated that these cooperatives will also serve as a forum for profit-sharing arrangements similar to American Fisheries Act (AFA) cooperatives. • Community Development Quota allocations will be increased from 7.5 percent to 10 percent of the TAC. A community quota of brown crab was also established for Adak, a similarly situated community that lies outside the CDQ program. • A cool down period that would restrict the movement of processing activity from crab dependent communities for a period of two years following implementation of the program. • Allow communities to purchase harvest and processing shares and grant crab dependent communities the right of first refusal to purchase processing shares that may transfer outside of the communities. Grant communities in the Northern Gulf of Alaska the right of first refusal on the sale of processor shares from communities that are not dependent on the crab fisheries. • A captain share allocation of 3 percent of the TAC was established for exclusive use by captains and crew. • A vertical integration cap of 5% is used to control processor accumulation of harvesting privileges. • Use and ownership caps on harvesting and processing privileges are included to limit consolidation and excessive control. • A mandatory binding arbitration program will be used to settle any outstanding price disputes between harvesters and processors. • A crew loan program will assist crewmember entry into the fisheries. • Harvest restrictions, (called GOA sideboards) were included to protect non-rationalized Gulf of Alaska fisheries. • Comprehensive data collection and program review will be used to assess the success of the rationalization program and to make modifications where needed. As a Council, we have an obligation to review program performance, especially with respect to impacts on all three partners. And we will make necessary adjustments to achieve our stated goals and minimize unintended consequences. Through program review we can adjust elements of the initial policy design. This flexibility is uncommon to most market based rationalization plans. Specifically, we can 1. adjust the percentage of B shares. 2. adjust attributes intended to protect community interests in a region. 3. adjust the mechanism for community protection. 4. adjust specific design features to adapt to changes in stock status. Overall, the crab rationalization program strikes a balance among the interests of harvesters, processors, and communities. The Council, based on exhaustive public input over three years, unanimously approved the crab rationalization program. In making this unanimous vote Council members recognized the comprehensive, balanced approach that incorporated both short and long-term safeguards to protect the interests of all three partners. BENEFITS FOR HARVESTERS, PROCESSORS AND COMMUNITIES Now, I would like to address the how and why involved in creating a stable three-legged stool, where harvesters, processors and communities each benefit from crab rationalization. First in the line of benefactors are the fishermen. All eligible fishermen gain by having value attached to their fishing history. Some will have more value than others. The years selected for qualifying quota share determine the extent that each fishermen gains. The Council chose the years agreed to by the industry committee and recommended by the Advisory Panel. More recent years were also considered, and in a few cases adopted, based on NOAA general counsel’s advice to consider recency for qualification determinations. Regardless of where a fisherman sits in the qualifying period, the award of quota generates immediate value and economic gain over the race-for-fish scenario. Furthermore, it is anticipated that consolidation and the ability to stack quota, combined with a buy back program, could reduce the crab fleet significantly. This results in very significant economic gains to the remaining participants. Even though these economic gains are recognized by many crab fishermen, there was still a need to address ‘equity issues’ and balance of negotiating strength between fishermen and processors. With respect to these issues, the Council provided many protective measures to ensure that vessel owners are not disadvantaged. They include: · A discount of each processor’s history, which leaves 10% of the harvest shares (B shares) open to delivery to any processor. It is anticipated that these B shares will provide adequate negotiating leverage for fishermen. · A system of binding arbitration that to ensure that no harvester will be forced to accept a price by a processor holding processor shares. The system will be conducted using an independent third party arbitrator when or if there is a price dispute between harvesters and a processor. It will include an opportunity for groups of harvesters to bargain collectively, as they have traditionally for Bering Sea crab prices, or to enter arbitration on an individual basis. The binding arbitration approach adopted by the Council also provides for independent market analysis and a non-binding pre-season price formula. · Processors will be required to give the regulators full, complete and detailed crab processing costs and crab sales revenues. This information will be useful for the Council to monitor the way revenues are shared with vessel owners. · Caps on the amount of harvesting shares that can be owned by or affiliated with processors. This is intended to ensure that the processor will continue to need crab from independent harvesters. · Prohibiting vessels owned by processors from being awarded “B” harvest shares. This was done in order to further protect the interests of independent harvesters. While not a direct part of the Council’s motion to protect fishermen’s interest, there is another key advantage that accrues to fishermen as a result of rationalization. Currently, harvesters cannot really withhold product from processors for long periods of time because the current open-access model allows any catcher processor or other strike breaker to fish while others remain tied to the dock. Once IFQ is issued, every harvester can – either individually or as a member of a cooperative – withhold product from the processing sector without fear of someone else harvesting it. As learned from the AFA model, the ability to withhold product is a powerful tactic that fishermen can use to leverage fair prices. It is also important to point out that the Council instituted caps on the amount of consolidation that may occur among the processors. The consolidation rules are far more restrictive than what would be required under normal antitrust laws, and they are intended to ensure multiple market opportunities. Furthermore, when crab stocks are low, a quota system that includes processors should result in less concentration of processing facilities and more buying entities as firms could choose to lease quota or have their shares custom processed. These measures to keep the existing processing base healthy while allowing for new entrants should expand, not limit, market opportunities for fishermen. The next set of benefactors are the crab processors. Having observed processor fallout from the harvester only allocation on IFQs for halibut and sablefish, and processor viability under the AFA cooperatives, the Council made a deliberate choice to include processors in the rationalization program. This decision to protect processor’s investments also responds to the Congressional direction given to the Council. Under the sablefish IFQ program (note: sablefish is a more appropriate comparison than halibut because sablefish did not change product form from frozen to fresh) only 25 of the 67 pre-IFQ firms survived the harvester only allocation of quota according to thorough analysis done by Washington State University. Additionally, most of the surviving processing firms lost market share. Processor shares will allow the processing sector to more fully experience the efficiency gains of rationalization and thus remain viable. With the ability to trade and purchase processing shares, up to a set limit, it is anticipated that the number of processors available to buy crab may actually increase. In the very least, award of processor shares should stabilize the crab processing sector so that the number of currently viable processors will remain the same. Similar to fishermen, processors have concern that they will be ‘price takers’. Currently, some processors estimate that fishermen capture upwards of 87% of the wholesale price of crab. Crab harvesters are organized under the 1934 Act, into a monopolistic bargaining association and as such, negotiate price as one entity represented by the Alaska Marketing Association. The processors are not similarly organized and argue that the bargaining strength is all in the fishermen’s hands. This perspective suggests that like beauty, bargaining strength is in the eyes of the beholder, or the potential loser in this case. Nonetheless, the Council’s approach to binding arbitration, data collection and program review are aimed to protect the processing sector as well. Lastly, the Council chose to provide specific community protection measures to recognize the investment of communities in the development of the Bering Sea crab fisheries, noting the very real likelihood for those same communities to experience irreparable harm without protection. As you know, National Standard 8 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act directs Fishery Management Councils to take into account a) the need for sustained participation of fishing communities and b) minimizing adverse economic impacts to such communities. The Council chose to address communities and National Standard 8 through a “three pie” approach to rationalizing the crab fisheries in the Bering Sea. There are two key elements to the community third pie - a) market-based allocations to community interests and b) measures to protect communities from potentially adverse effects. Following are the specific elements of the ‘community third pie’. Market-based Allocations to Community Interests include: · Expanding the CDQ program (includes 65 Western Alaska communities) to include all crab fisheries approved under the rationalization program with the exception of Western AI brown king crab. · Increasing the CDQ allocation of crab from 7.5% to 10%. · Allocating the percentage of Western AI brown king crab not used during the base period to the community of Adak and require that up to 50% of the “A” share brown king crab be processed in Adak. · Allowing for purchase of processing and harvesting shares by crab dependent communities not included in the CDQ program. Give these same communities the right of first refusal for processing shares that may leave their communities after a two-year cool down period. Grant communities in the Northern Gulf of Alaska the right of first refusal on the sale of processor shares from communities that are not dependent on the crab fisheries. Community Protection Measures include: · Establishing two regions to protect historical, primary delivery patterns of various crab species and attach regional designations to crab harvested with Class A shares and to processing quota shares. · Maximizing the benefits of regionalization on the communities of St. Paul and St. George by limiting B shares to 10% of the total amount of crab. · Imposing a two-year (post implementation) cool down period where processing shares must remain in the originating community. · Imposing processing use caps to assure that at least two plants will always be operating in the Northern Region and four plants in the Southern Region. · Limiting the future expansion of the offshore catcher processor fleet so that more crab might be processed in community based plants. · Requiring that a portion (equivalent to the increase received) of CDQ crab be delivered to shore-based plants. · Allowing for the transfer of catcher processor shares to shore-based processors. · Providing a 3% allocation to help captains, some of who reside in coastal communities, to leverage future employment opportunities in a rationalized crab fishery. · Excluding small, underutilized crab stocks from the rationalization program so that small vessel, state water fisheries could be developed near communities. The direct allocation of harvesting and processing shares, and purchase of processing shares by communities, translates into direct benefits to Alaska’s coastal communities. These actions in conjunction with the regionalization elements comprise the ‘meat of the third pie’. Although processor shares are typically viewed as part of the second pie, the issuance of such shares has direct implications for the protection of a community’s processing base. As noted above, experience to date with the issuance of harvester only allocation in Alaska reveals a dramatic reduction and shift in shore based processing operations. While the causes for this shift and reduction are complex and debatable, it is good public policy to try and minimize these impacts, as the more processors that survive the transition to a ‘rationalized fishery’ the better the community’s economic base will be. Such a system inherently benefits communities as well as processors. Furthermore, the establishment of processor shares allowed for the creation of additional community protection measures. In essence, the processor pie helps makes the community pie whole. CATCHER PROCESSORS There remains one more sector that benefits from the Council’s action – catcher processors. Catcher processors have long had an advantage over all other sectors participating in the harvesting and processing of BSAI crab. This advantage comes about from being 100% vertically integrated operations, which do not have to purchase all their crab. The Council’s action solidified this sector of the industry through the creation of catcher processor shares. However, the Council chose not to allow this sector to grow at the expense of the onshore sector and disenfranchise Alaska’s coastal communities. Hence, the Council’s program limits catcher processors to their historical aggregate level. In essence, the Council made the catcher processor sector whole without being punitive and for some fisheries such as the Aleutian Islands brown king crab, the Council chose qualifying years that advantaged catcher processors. CRITICISM OF COUNCIL ACTION Despite the balanced approach of the Council motion and extensive efforts to be inclusive of all affected parties, the Council action still faces criticism. I will take some time to address the following concerns: · Not including the year 2000 for processing shares · Not creating a higher portion of B shares · Antitrust implications of processing shares. Year 2000 It is reported that including 2000 would have benefited Kodiak based processors. While is true that the year 2000 was one of Kodiak’s better years in terms of BSAI crab landings, the Council analysis shows that Bristol Bay Red King Crab comprised 1.8% of the total value of fish landed at the port of Kodiak and Bering Sea Opilio Crab represented 1.35% of the total value landed in the year 2000. It is important to note that the year 2000 was not included in the recommendations made by the industry committee which, incidentally, included Kodiak representatives who did not bring this concern forward. The committee noted that the year 2000 was not included for a number of reasons: (a) it was the only year that had a delayed start date of April 1 due to inclement weather and some vessels did not participate with the season change date; (b) it was the only potentially qualifying year affected by the AFA processor sideboards; and (c) a large storm greatly disadvantaged some small Alaskan vessels. As such, the year 2000 was seen as an anomaly and not included in the recommendations or in the Council actions. Nonetheless, processors in Kodiak will still benefit from the rationalization program, as they will no longer just be the port of last load delivery. With a slower, extended fishery fishermen will have the time to deliver mid-season to Kodiak processors. There are processors in Kodiak who will receive processor shares. Other processors in Kodiak have the option of buying processor shares or receiving ‘open delivery’ B-shares of crab. In fact, Kodiak, home to Alaska’s largest crab fleet, is the port that is expected to benefit most from the ‘open delivery’ arrangement. To help ensure this, the Council made B-shares off limits to catcher processors. Kodiak is not the only community to gain under the Council’s rationalization plan. Dutch Harbor, St. Paul, St. George, Adak, Sand Point and all the communities under the CDQ program gain in the Council’s three-pie approach to rationalization. Why 10% B Shares In determining the appropriate amount of B shares, the Council first looked to the experience under AFA. In the AFA there is a similar 10% discount on processing history, i.e.; vessels may deliver up to 10% of their catch to any processor. Immediately after AFA passage, many harvesters tried to get the Council to amend the AFA agreement. They did so under the Dooley-Hall proposal. There were claims that the processors would capture all the profits. Today, if one were to ask key Dooley-Hall advocates if they are disenfranchised and would prefer no AFA or AFA as originally passed, their answer is unequivocal: AFA as enacted by Congress. This suggests that a 10% discount could serve as adequate negotiation leverage in a large-boat industrialized fishery. Based on the cost and wholesale data provided by crab processors, it does not make sense to discount processor history any more than the 10% level selected by the Council. Data was provided to the Council in public testimony that shows that processor margins are very thin, and probably non-existent in the small quota, slow-paced crab fisheries. With these low margins, processors will be hungry for all deliveries of crab, especially the crab delivered last. Once the start-up and initial operation costs have been covered, the remaining loads of delivered crab are where the margins increase and profits are realized. Additionally, crab fishermen (through their bargaining association) now allocate crab as a reward for a company setting the price, a price that in turn is adopted by the rest of the companies. The amount allocated has been less than 5% to achieve this advantage. This demonstrates the power of having 10% (or less) of the crab to allocate to processors as a reward for higher price. As such, the notion that the fishermen delivering last will become a price hostage is a notion unsupported by existing economic reality. No one will fish A-shares without a contract. There will be no “last harvester leaving the grounds.” Furthermore, with the adoption of voluntary cooperatives between fishermen and in discussions with a processor of their choice, it is anticipated that price and profit-sharing arrangements will: a) cover all the crab the harvester intends to deliver, including the 10% B shares portion; b) address profit sharing across vessels participating in the cooperative; and c) be agreed to well in advance of the season. Public testimony from the community of St. Paul also pointed out that a higher amount of B shares would negatively impact their economic base. The balancing act of community interests required the Council to consider these concerns as well when determining the appropriate amount of B shares. Antitrust Issues The Department of Justice has not found any anti-competitive effects in the division of whiting allocations among catcher-processors or the division of pollock allocations among AFA cooperatives. It is expected that the Department will view the crab rationalization plan in a similar light. The Congressional Research Service has already made a similar review of the Council’s action to create processor shares and concluded “that the federal antitrust laws are likely to be deemed irrelevant in the context of the subject proposal”. Even with this green light from the Congressional Research Service it is important to note that the same anti-competitive issues that are being raised under crab rationalization were brought up under the AFA. Since the processor provisions of the AFA had no anti-competitive effects, then the less restrictive processor elements included in the Council approach on BSAI Crab Rationalization should be viewed similarly. The less restrictive provisions of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab rationalization program include: 1) no closed class of processors (new processors can purchase ‘open delivery’ B shares or allocated shares from a qualifying processor); and 2) no direct linkage between fishermen and processors. The 1934 Fisherman's Marketing Act contains an explicit statutory exemption from the antitrust laws allowing fishermen to bargain collectively in price negotiations with fish processors. The fishermen are allowed to decide, as a group, on their bargaining position, an activity that would violate the federal antitrust laws without the exemption. The Whiting Cooperative (vertically integrated catcher processors) and the AFA inshore cooperatives have each submitted to the Department of Justice a request for a "business review letter" concerning planned cooperative activities. Section 210 of the AFA requires each cooperative to request a business review letter prior to submitting the cooperative contract to the Council and the Secretary. Each cooperative described its proposed activities of allocating pollock quotas among member vessels. In response, the Department of Justice has issued the requested business review letters stating that the Department of Justice finds that the described activities are not anti-competitive and the Department intends to take no enforcement action. However, the AFA does not require the cooperative to have received a business review letter and the AFA does not grant an exemption to the antitrust laws. While we anticipate a similar ruling for crab cooperatives, if Congress approves the Council’s crab rationalization plan, this is a non-issue. CONCLUDING REMARKS In closing let me emphasize that while imposing an allocation scheme automatically has varying impacts among the participants, the Council strove to make all sectors – harvesters, processors, and communities – win from BSAI crab rationalization. It was a challenging balancing act to say the least. However, through the hard work of the industry committee, the Council staff, the Advisory Panel and the community representatives, the Council’s preferred alternative does benefit all sectors. And most importantly, BSAI Crab Rationalization will save lives and improve management while reducing bycatch and deadloss. The program is a Voluntary Three Pie Cooperative with unique protections and opportunities for communities and captains. The novelty of the program compelled the Council to include several safeguards into the program, including a binding arbitration program for the resolution of price disputes and extensive data collection and review programs to assess the success of the rationalization program. These safeguards demonstrate the Council’s commitment to a fair and equitable rationalization program that will protect the interests of all sectors which depend on these crab fisheries. In unanimously adopting the crab rationalization plan, the Council made it very clear that the program was one crafted specifically for the crab fisheries of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands, and that in so doing no one should assume a similar system for other fisheries under its jurisdiction. We have met the charge given to us by Congress. We have acted responsibly and creatively to meet all the standards of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. It is time for Congress to move the plan to rationalize these crab fisheries forward.

• Mr. Arni Thomson