Opening Remarks

• The Honorable Joe Biden

Testimony

• Mr. Allan H. Selig
  Read statement

  Testimony

  Mr. Allan H. Selig

  STATEMENT OF ALLAN H. SELIG, COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL MARCH 10, 2004 One of my primary policy objectives as the Commissioner of Baseball is to eliminate the use of performance-enhancing substances in our great game. I am committed to the idea that Baseball must have a program on performance-enhancing substances that is consistent with accepted international standards for sport so that we can remove the cloud, that fairly or unfairly, has been cast over our sport and its athletes. My commitment on this issue is long-standing. In 1999, long before BALCO or the well-publicized allegations of steroid use by former players, I convened a meeting of my senior staff, respected experts and team physicians to discuss the issue of performance-enhancing substances and to develop a strategic approach for dealing with that issue. Over a period of a few weeks, we developed and began to implement a four-point strategic plan. First, we felt it was important to eliminate steroid use before players reach the Major Leagues. Because we do not have a collective bargaining obligation in the minor leagues, I was able quickly to develop and implement unilaterally in the spring of 2001, the first ever minor league drug policy. That policy has been amended and updated each year. In its present form, it is consistent with the highest international standards and I hope to have a similar policy in the Major Leagues. The key features of the minor league policy include: · A comprehensive ban on all performance-enhancing substances including steroids. · Year-round unannounced random testing of minor league players. · Immediate fifteen (15) game suspensions without pay for first time offenders and escalating discipline thereafter. · A strict liability approach under which athletes are held accountable for any substance found in their bodies regardless of intent or the source. Last year, we conducted nearly 5,000 tests in the minor leagues. Second, we committed ourselves to a comprehensive educational program on performance-enhancing substances. As we speak, Baseball’s medical experts are engaged in a tour of all thirty spring training camps to meet with players and explain the serious health issues associated with the use of performance-enhancing substances. This spring, in conjunction with the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Major League Baseball will produce two public service announcements that will air on our national broadcasts and will be made available to all thirty Clubs for use in their local markets. These spots explain the dangers of performance-enhancing substances, especially to young people. Third, we decided to become active supporters of legislative efforts to increase the regulation of performance-enhancing substances masquerading as so called “nutritional supplements.” Just this week, Congressman John Sweeney conducted a press conference at my office in New York to publicize the introduction of legislation to regulate precursors such as androstenedione and designer steroids such as THG. We have supported the Hatch-Biden Bill which also regulates precursors and was co-sponsored by Chairman McCain. The fourth and most difficult part of our strategy was to make the problem of performance-enhancing substances a bargaining priority in our negotiations with the MLBPA. The MLBPA approached our 2002 negotiations with a long-standing, deep-rooted philosophical objection to drug testing of any type. Baseball had to deal with this opposition in an extraordinarily difficult labor relations environment. As I am sure you will recall, Baseball experienced a crippling strike in 1994 – 1995. As the 2002 negotiations approached, the Clubs were still feeling the economic effects of the strike and the mere prospect of bargaining caused a number of Senators, Congresspersons, the media and millions of fans to express grave concern about the possibility of another work stoppage. In this difficult environment, the Clubs held to their commitment to address the problem of performance-enhancing substances. Mr. Angelos, who is here with me today, can attest that drug testing was probably the most contentious issue throughout the process, and the new drug agreement was one of the last issues resolved in the hours of continuous bargaining before the MLBPA strike deadline in August of 2002. Ultimately, the agreement we accepted on drugs was a compromise. We accepted less than we wanted because, in my judgment as the Commissioner, we had pushed the MLBPA as far as it would go without a strike and, equally important, the Clubs, whatever their convictions, were profoundly concerned about the impact of another strike. Compromise or not, the new joint drug agreement is an important step forward on the issue of performance-enhancing substances. Baseball administered over fourteen hundred random drug tests in the Major Leagues last year and will administer a similar number this year. There is anecdotal evidence that the testing has had the desired prophylactic effect. Going forward, players will be subject to suspensions without pay that will impose tremendous economic penalties. As important as this step is, I realize that we have work to do. We need more frequent and year-round testing of players. We need immediate penalties for those caught using illegal substances. We need a program that bans all performance-enhancing substances regardless of whether the substances are categorized as steroids or nutritional supplements. We need a program that will meet accepted international standards and allow for the continued internationalization of our game. The MLBPA has been made aware of our desire to strengthen the Joint Drug Agreement to address growing concerns about performance-enhancing substances. It goes without saying that this issue will be a priority in our next negotiations. But I understand the need to act now, without sacrificing the rights and protections secured by the MLBPA in the last agreement. It is imperative that the MLBPA leadership and the players join me in a cooperative effort to restore the faith of the fans in our game and its great players.

• Mr. Donald Fehr
  Read statement

  Testimony

  Mr. Donald Fehr

  BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE and TRANSPORTATION STATEMENT OF DONALD M. FEHR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 10 MARCH 2004 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is Donald M. Fehr, and, as the Members of this Committee know, I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball Players Association. I appear today in response to the Chairman's invitation to testify with respect to the drug treatment and prevention program in Major League Baseball, specifically as it relates to substances which are considered to be performance-enhancing. I appreciate the Committee’s interest in and concern about the unlawful use of steroids which led to this hearing. Let me begin by re-stating the MLBPA’s position, articulated last before this Committee in June, 2002. The Major League Baseball Players Association neither condones nor supports the use by players, or by anyone else, of any unlawful substance, nor do we support or condone the unlawful use of any legal substance. I cannot put it more plainly: both the use of any illegal substance and the illegal use of any lawful substance are wrong. Permit me also to offer a note of caution. While there is no dispute that this is a very serious issue, each of us should take care not to treat unsubstantiated media reports and rumors as if they were proven fact. Anyone who lives in the public eye should recognize the damage that an unfair accusation can inflict. For this reason, among others, I will not discuss these issues with respect to any particular individual, and I urge the Members of the Committee to adopt a similar approach. As I indicated in June of 2002, use of unlawful steroids was then a subject of ongoing collective bargaining between the Players Association and the Major League Clubs. That round of bargaining produced a new Basic Agreement between the parties in September of that year. Before turning to that agreement, it may be helpful to briefly describe the history of such issues in our bargaining relationship. The matter of drug treatment and prevention is not new to major league baseball. Nor is the demonstrable willingness of the parties -- the Players and the Clubs-- to address the issue, despite significant differences over the means that may be appropriately employed to confront the shared goal of the elimination of unlawful drug use in the sport. Two decades ago, in response to a growing concern about the alleged use of cocaine by players, the parties undertook extensive, and at times contentious, negotiations which resulted in the first Joint Drug Agreement in the major professional sports. The emphasis of that agreement was on treatment and prevention, and its provisions were designed to encourage and assist players to address any chemical use or misuse problems they might be experiencing. During those negotiations, the subject of suspicionless urine testing of players was advocated by the Clubs, and opposed by us. We thought then -- and believe now - that the testing of an individual, not because of something he is suspected to have done, but simply because he is a member of a particular class, is at odds with fundamental principles of which we in this country have long and rightly been proud. It is not up to the individual to prove he is innocent, especially of a charge of which he is not reasonably suspected. Moreover, one should not, absent compelling safety considerations, invade the privacy of someone without a substantial reason – that is, without cause – related to that individual. While the 4th Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not directly applicable to the private employment setting, the important principles on which it is based should not be lightly put aside. The Clubs then, as they do now, articulated a different view (echoed by much of the media). This fundamental disagreement did not, however, stop the parties from continuing to work toward the shared goal of the elimination of the illicit use of drugs by players. Over the years, even in the aftermath of the termination of that first Joint Drug Agreement, the parties forged a working relationship that eliminated contested cases in this once volatile, highly charged, area. We have been able to do that with a program that emphasizes education, not punishment, that includes progressive, not draconian, discipline, and that includes individual cause-based, not suspicionless, testing - - in other words, a program consistent with basic principles of due process. This history is notable because it provides a needed context for the latest round of bargaining. Coming into the negotiations that produced the September, 2002 Basic Agreement, the parties sought to respond to a new problem in the sport -- reports of widespread use of anabolic steroids. How did the parties bridge the 20 year old divide between them on the subject of suspicionless testing? By agreeing to a Players Association formulation for what can only fairly be regarded -- and I can assure you was regarded by the Clubs - - as a significant concession by the Association. In essence, we proposed to break the decades old deadlock on suspicionless testing by agreeing to a triggering mechanism; an unannounced anonymous test of not simply every player in the bargaining unit, but 120% of them (i.e., 20% of the players were tested twice). A total of 1438 tests were conducted in an 1198 player group, a ratio of actual tests to the number of individuals eligible to be tested that we understand far exceeds the norm in most other testing regimes. If more than 5% of those 1438 tests came back positive, the Players Association would recede from its decades long opposition to suspicionless testing of all players, which would then begin and continue unless the number of positives fell below 2.5% over two consecutive years. If, conversely, the trigger was not met, the Clubs would recede from their position, with the important qualification that the triggering mechanism would remain in place for each successive year of the Agreement. A few points should be made about the conduct of the 2003 survey testing. Despite some contrary suggestions in the media, players did not know when the tests were to be administered. Nor was the timing of the tests determined by the Commissioner's Office, or by the Players Association. The 2003 survey results were not even analyzed, much less predetermined (as one reporter had suggested) by the parties. Rather, the parties simply received from the testing administrators, through the laboratory which conducted the tests, a report of the numerical results. It is in the nature of drug testing that test results can sometimes require interpretation by the administering scientists, and the 2003 survey presented a few such instances. Yet, literally within hours of receipt of the test results as delivered by the laboratory, both parties agreed, and then promptly announced, that somewhere between 5 and 7% of the tests -- not of the players, but of the tests -- were positive. Under the agreement we reached, this result means that, starting in 2004, all Players will be tested on an unannounced, identified basis for the unlawful use of steroids, without any requirement that cause related to the individual to be tested be shown. But, just as the 2003 survey was decried as illegitimate while being undertaken, the 2004 programmatic testing is already being criticized before the first test has even been conducted. Much of the criticism may be simply uninformed; in other cases it proceeds from dissatisfaction with this or that provision of our agreement. A Player who tests positive will be evaluated by the joint Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC). After that evaluation, HPAC will prescribe a Treatment Program for the Player, which can subject him to further testing. The Player is then subject to the progressive discipline set forth in the Basic Agreement, which calls for increased levels of suspensions without pay, or substantial fines, for any subsequent positive test result, or violation of his Treatment Program. For example, a second positive can result in a suspension of 15 days, which in an average case will result in the loss of almost $200,000. It also should be understood that positive tests triggering the increased levels of discipline could be tests required by the Treatment Program, and not merely the next round of testing for the bargaining unit. Moreover, Players are always subject to for-cause testing, in addition to the suspicionless testing now in place. If any Club or central office official has information that gives him reason to believe a Player is unlawfully using steroids, it can refer the matter to HPAC, which may order diagnostic testing if it believes it appropriate to do so. If HPAC determines the claim has merit, it can prescribe a Treatment Program, and, as noted, that Program may include further testing. The Agreement we made is fair, carefully constructed, and balances important interests on both sides. It was agreed to by the Association after a full airing of the problem, various possible remedies, and the risks and benefits of each approach. Every Player had ample opportunity to voice his views on all sides of the issue. We believe the program has worked, is working, and will continue to do so. We recognize, however, that it is the passage of time, and only that, which will tell us whether our program represents a meaningful and appropriate response to the unlawful use of anabolic steroids in the sport. If it does not, the labor law provides avenues to address any shortcomings. It is easy, I submit, for someone outside of baseball, or any other sport for that matter, to criticize our agreement. There seems to be a notion on the part of some that any "clean" player should be willing to be tested at any time or place or in any manner and frequency an employer or third party might choose. And, the argument continues, the failure to advocate that approach evidences a lack of concern for the health of the player, or appropriate concern for the well-being of any youngster who may seek to emulate the player. Such arguments gloss over other interests at stake worthy of attention. While it sometimes seems as if such considerations get lost in the ever louder discussion, each of us has an interest in preventing unwarranted invasions of privacy. Every one of us has an interest in making sure we do not turn on its head the fundamental precept that people are innocent until proven guilty, not the other way around. Moreover, those who agree to voluntarily participate in a testing program, especially those in the public eye, are entitled to some expectation of privacy and confidentiality. Such interests are worthy of protection, even in the workplace; even in the workplace of professional athletes. Under the National Labor Relations Act the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment is committed to good faith collective bargaining between employers and the organizations selected by and representing employees. The agreement reached in September, 2002, is a product of that process. (As I indicated to you twenty months ago, this issue was discussed and debated by and with the players on every club in the several weeks following my appearance here.) We continue to believe that collective bargaining is the appropriate forum for consideration and resolution of these issues. One of the premises of our labor laws is that solutions devised by the parties in the workplace are more likely to be workable and enduring, precisely because forged by those parties, rather than by others outside that relationship, no matter how well intentioned they may be. Though many question our choices, the Association exists, in part, to protect and defend those we represent against assertions of power over the players as a group, or individually, and to act in a manner consistent with a variety of their interests. It is our charge under the law, and we take it very seriously. But I can hear the shouts now: “Baseball is different.” Because major league baseball players are highly paid, or because baseball is part of the fabric of life in this country, talk about basic American principles, including free collective bargaining, is considered inappropriate, or misplaced, or simply glossed over, because “baseball is different.” I do not decry such notions, because I recognize what prompts them, a deep affection for the game itself. So, let me conclude with a couple of observations. First, we share, with the owners and the fans, the goal of a game free of the unlawful use of drugs, but we believe this goal not only can be, but must be, attained with proper respect, not just for the game, but for the players as well. How a society goes about fulfilling its aspirations may say more about it than the aspirations themselves. Second, and finally, love it as many fans, owners, and members of this Congress do, after representing major league players for nearly 27 years, I can say without reservation that no one cares more deeply about the game than those who play it. Yes, some fans, some owners, some members of Congress, may care as much about baseball as those who have devoted their lives to playing it. But not one cares an ounce more. I will be pleased to try to answer any questions. Respectfully submitted, Donald M. Fehr

• Mr. Paul J. Tagliabue

  Commissioner

  National Football League
  Read statement

  Testimony

  Mr. Paul J. Tagliabue

  TESTIMONY OF PAUL TAGLIABUE COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND EUGENE UPSHAW EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION MARCH 10, 2004 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are, respectively, the Commissioner of the National Football League and the Executive Director of the NFL Players Association, the labor union that represents all NFL players in collective bargaining. We have submitted this joint statement to emphasize that, whatever other issues management and labor may disagree upon, there is complete agreement between us on this: steroids and other performance enhancing substances have no place in our game, or anywhere in sports. For many years, we have been committed to keeping them out of the NFL, and we will continue to work together and with government and private parties to help remove them from American life. In recent weeks, this subject has again received renewed attention. The President’s comments in his State of the Union address, combined with the recent indictments in connection with the BALCO case, have focused a wide audience on the use of performance enhancing substances in sports, and have brought to the forefront what many observers have come to recognize – that this is both an ongoing challenge and one that is likely to be more complex and difficult to address successfully. In the NFL, we have been focused on these issues of performance-enhancing substances since the late 1980s. The League’s then-Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, instituted both educational and disciplinary programs in the late 1980’s to deter the use of performance-enhancing substances by NFL players and to eliminate them from our game. Educational efforts have led both our teams and our players to support strong measures, developed jointly by the League and the Players Association, to eliminate these illicit substances from NFL football – and to send a message to others in football at the intercollegiate, high school and youth levels that the use of performance-enhancing substances is not the way to play or succeed in football. Against this backdrop, we strongly support S.1780, the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2003, which you have co-sponsored, Mr. Chairman. This bill would expand the definition of steroids and precursors as controlled substances and increase the penalties associated with distribution of these substances. We understand that a companion bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives, and we will strongly support that bill as well. We are pleased to appear today to offer the Committee a description of the NFL’s Policy and Program on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances. That program has been in place for more than a decade, and is the most comprehensive in professional sports today. Our results confirm that the program is very effective. It reflects a strong and ongoing commitment on the part of both our organizations, backed by substantial financial investments, top scientific resources, and more than a few tough decisions. The NFL began testing players for steroids in 1987; started suspending violators in 1989; and instituted in 1990 a year-round random testing program, including during the off-season, backed by immediate suspensions for any violation. The program has strong features to deter evasion, including suspension for players testing positive for masking agents or who attempt to dilute their urine to beat the tests. Players who test positive are subject to up to 24 unannounced tests per year, including during the off-season. They remain subject to this frequent, year-round testing for the remainder of their careers. We also recognize the importance of staying current, and have consistently expanded our own list of prohibited substances – in the past three years, nearly 20 additional substances have been added to the banned list. Those included ephedra, which we prohibited three years ago. As the Committee knows, the federal government is now in the process of banning that dangerous supplement. Why has this issue been among the highest priorities of the N.F.L. and its players? First, these substances threaten the fairness and the integrity of the game on the field. To allow the use of steroids and banned stimulants would not only condone cheating, but also compel others to use them to remain competitive. Second, we have a responsibility to protect our players from the demonstrated adverse health effects of steroids and other banned substances. Medical literature is replete with research linking the use of these substances to a wide range of serious health problems. Third, we take seriously our role in educating and leading young people. As President Bush said, the use of performance-enhancing drugs is dangerous and sends the wrong message that there are shortcuts to success and that performance at any price is more important than integrity. The key provisions of our policy are: · An annual test for all players plus unannounced random testing in and out of season. We test players on all teams each week of the season, conducting more than 9,000 tests a year for steroids and related substances. · A list of more than 70 prohibited substances, including anabolic steroids, steroid precursors, growth hormone, stimulants and masking agents. This list is continually revised and expanded. · A mandatory four-game suspension (25 percent of the regular season) without pay upon a first violation. A second violation would result in a six-game suspension and a third would ban a player for a minimum of one year. Players cannot return to the field until they test clean and are cleared for play. · Strict liability for players who test positive. Violations are not excused because a player says he was unaware that a product contained a banned substance. · Education of players and teams about the program through literature, videos, a toll-free hotline and mandatory meetings. The consistent application of these core tenets has resulted in the recognition of the N.F.L.'s policy as the most effective in professional sports. Over the past five seasons, less than 1 percent of our players (a total of 25) have violated our steroid program and been suspended. In short, virtually all of our players get the message and participate in the NFL without using anabolic steroids or other performance-enhancing substances. When our steroid testing lab — the U.C.L.A. Olympic Analytical Laboratory — informed us last year of the new designer steroid called THG, we immediately added it to our banned substance list and started officially testing for it on a uniform basis on Oct. 6. Since then, we have randomly tested more than 3,000 player urine samples and there have been no THG positives. We spend $10 million a year on our steroid and drug programs, including the funding of research to identify new substances and improve testing. To date, we have invested close to $100 million on this initiative. And we are prepared to do more if necessary. Despite the efforts that we and others in sport have made to eliminate anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs from our athletic competitions, there are those in America and elsewhere who will seek to beat the system by designing and producing illicit substances that inappropriately affect athletic performance while escaping detection. THG is only the latest such substance to become a controversial issue and attract wide attention. Over the years we have worked very hard with specialists and the scientific community to minimize the potential for such evasion, and we believe that our efforts have been successful. With respect to THG specifically, our extensive random tests during the past football season – from early October through the end of our season this January – did not identify any NFL player as using THG, and we have no information suggesting that any significant number of NFL players used THG before this past season. But we will continue our efforts to confirm this belief with reliable test results. As announced earlier this week, we have partnered with the United States Anti-Doping Agency to establish a new research and drug testing laboratory at the University of Utah. This lab will work closely with Utah’s highly respected Center for Human Toxicology, which is renowned for its forensic analytical toxicology expertise. Today new challenges are being presented by the improper use of human growth hormone and the continuing advance of gene therapy and genetic manipulation. Both the government and private sectors must aggressively address these challenges. If not, the secret designers of new illicit substances will slog on, and the future will bring more high-profile grand jury investigations, health risks to young people and dishonor to sports. Mr. Chairman, we in the NFL thank you for your leadership on this issue, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

• Mr. Gene Upshaw

  Executive Director

  National Football League Players Association
  Read statement

  Testimony

  Mr. Gene Upshaw

  TESTIMONY OF PAUL TAGLIABUE COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND EUGENE UPSHAW EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION MARCH 10, 2004 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are, respectively, the Commissioner of the National Football League and the Executive Director of the NFL Players Association, the labor union that represents all NFL players in collective bargaining. We have submitted this joint statement to emphasize that, whatever other issues management and labor may disagree upon, there is complete agreement between us on this: steroids and other performance enhancing substances have no place in our game, or anywhere in sports. For many years, we have been committed to keeping them out of the NFL, and we will continue to work together and with government and private parties to help remove them from American life. In recent weeks, this subject has again received renewed attention. The President’s comments in his State of the Union address, combined with the recent indictments in connection with the BALCO case, have focused a wide audience on the use of performance enhancing substances in sports, and have brought to the forefront what many observers have come to recognize – that this is both an ongoing challenge and one that is likely to be more complex and difficult to address successfully. In the NFL, we have been focused on these issues of performance-enhancing substances since the late 1980s. The League’s then-Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, instituted both educational and disciplinary programs in the late 1980’s to deter the use of performance-enhancing substances by NFL players and to eliminate them from our game. Educational efforts have led both our teams and our players to support strong measures, developed jointly by the League and the Players Association, to eliminate these illicit substances from NFL football – and to send a message to others in football at the intercollegiate, high school and youth levels that the use of performance-enhancing substances is not the way to play or succeed in football. Against this backdrop, we strongly support S.1780, the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2003, which you have co-sponsored, Mr. Chairman. This bill would expand the definition of steroids and precursors as controlled substances and increase the penalties associated with distribution of these substances. We understand that a companion bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives, and we will strongly support that bill as well. We are pleased to appear today to offer the Committee a description of the NFL’s Policy and Program on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances. That program has been in place for more than a decade, and is the most comprehensive in professional sports today. Our results confirm that the program is very effective. It reflects a strong and ongoing commitment on the part of both our organizations, backed by substantial financial investments, top scientific resources, and more than a few tough decisions. The NFL began testing players for steroids in 1987; started suspending violators in 1989; and instituted in 1990 a year-round random testing program, including during the off-season, backed by immediate suspensions for any violation. The program has strong features to deter evasion, including suspension for players testing positive for masking agents or who attempt to dilute their urine to beat the tests. Players who test positive are subject to up to 24 unannounced tests per year, including during the off-season. They remain subject to this frequent, year-round testing for the remainder of their careers. We also recognize the importance of staying current, and have consistently expanded our own list of prohibited substances – in the past three years, nearly 20 additional substances have been added to the banned list. Those included ephedra, which we prohibited three years ago. As the Committee knows, the federal government is now in the process of banning that dangerous supplement. Why has this issue been among the highest priorities of the N.F.L. and its players? First, these substances threaten the fairness and the integrity of the game on the field. To allow the use of steroids and banned stimulants would not only condone cheating, but also compel others to use them to remain competitive. Second, we have a responsibility to protect our players from the demonstrated adverse health effects of steroids and other banned substances. Medical literature is replete with research linking the use of these substances to a wide range of serious health problems. Third, we take seriously our role in educating and leading young people. As President Bush said, the use of performance-enhancing drugs is dangerous and sends the wrong message that there are shortcuts to success and that performance at any price is more important than integrity. The key provisions of our policy are: · An annual test for all players plus unannounced random testing in and out of season. We test players on all teams each week of the season, conducting more than 9,000 tests a year for steroids and related substances. · A list of more than 70 prohibited substances, including anabolic steroids, steroid precursors, growth hormone, stimulants and masking agents. This list is continually revised and expanded. · A mandatory four-game suspension (25 percent of the regular season) without pay upon a first violation. A second violation would result in a six-game suspension and a third would ban a player for a minimum of one year. Players cannot return to the field until they test clean and are cleared for play. · Strict liability for players who test positive. Violations are not excused because a player says he was unaware that a product contained a banned substance. · Education of players and teams about the program through literature, videos, a toll-free hotline and mandatory meetings. The consistent application of these core tenets has resulted in the recognition of the N.F.L.'s policy as the most effective in professional sports. Over the past five seasons, less than 1 percent of our players (a total of 25) have violated our steroid program and been suspended. In short, virtually all of our players get the message and participate in the NFL without using anabolic steroids or other performance-enhancing substances. When our steroid testing lab — the U.C.L.A. Olympic Analytical Laboratory — informed us last year of the new designer steroid called THG, we immediately added it to our banned substance list and started officially testing for it on a uniform basis on Oct. 6. Since then, we have randomly tested more than 3,000 player urine samples and there have been no THG positives. We spend $10 million a year on our steroid and drug programs, including the funding of research to identify new substances and improve testing. To date, we have invested close to $100 million on this initiative. And we are prepared to do more if necessary. Despite the efforts that we and others in sport have made to eliminate anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs from our athletic competitions, there are those in America and elsewhere who will seek to beat the system by designing and producing illicit substances that inappropriately affect athletic performance while escaping detection. THG is only the latest such substance to become a controversial issue and attract wide attention. Over the years we have worked very hard with specialists and the scientific community to minimize the potential for such evasion, and we believe that our efforts have been successful. With respect to THG specifically, our extensive random tests during the past football season – from early October through the end of our season this January – did not identify any NFL player as using THG, and we have no information suggesting that any significant number of NFL players used THG before this past season. But we will continue our efforts to confirm this belief with reliable test results. As announced earlier this week, we have partnered with the United States Anti-Doping Agency to establish a new research and drug testing laboratory at the University of Utah. This lab will work closely with Utah’s highly respected Center for Human Toxicology, which is renowned for its forensic analytical toxicology expertise. Today new challenges are being presented by the improper use of human growth hormone and the continuing advance of gene therapy and genetic manipulation. Both the government and private sectors must aggressively address these challenges. If not, the secret designers of new illicit substances will slog on, and the future will bring more high-profile grand jury investigations, health risks to young people and dishonor to sports. Mr. Chairman, we in the NFL thank you for your leadership on this issue, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

• Mr. Terry Madden

  Chief Executive Officer

  U.S. Anti-Doping Agency
  Read statement

  Testimony

  Mr. Terry Madden

  March 10, 2004 Senate Hearing Conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Testimony of Terry Madden Chief Executive Officer, United States Anti-Doping Agency Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning, my name is Terry Madden. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. Today I come to you as the CEO of the United States Anti-Doping Agency, which has been recognized by Congress as the independent, national anti-doping agency for Olympic and Paralympic sport in the United States. While USADA has recently received increased attention for our role in the BALCO investigation, as many of you know, we have been working for more than three years to protect and preserve the health of athletes, the integrity of competition, and the well-being of sport through the elimination of doping. The use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport creates an atmosphere of coercion where clean athletes, who do not want to take drugs, feel compelled to do so to succeed. In this age of multi-million dollar rewards for sports success, the siren call of drugs is even more alluring. This problem is not confined to a single sport, a single country, a small number of athletes or an isolated group of unethical chemists. It affects every sport and threatens to undermine the integrity of athletics as a whole. It also sends the message that cheating is acceptable, and allows drug users to become role models for our nation’s youth. While some claim doping is a victimless violation of the rules, the true victims of doping are the athletes who wish to compete in clean sport and are denied this opportunity, as well as the public who is defrauded by athletic performances dependent on the use of drugs. Unfortunately, without a strong anti-doping system in place, the accomplishments of clean athletes can be unfairly tainted by the doping behavior of only a few. The purpose of the USADA anti-doping program, which was developed with the assistance and approval of Olympic Movement athletes, is to protect all athletes by deterring the use of drugs in the 45 Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Games sports. While there are many components to a successful anti-doping program, the most fundamental is the athletes’ knowledge that their use of prohibited substances and methods can be detected and that the penalties for breaking the rules are significant. An effective program begins with a sample collection plan that includes appropriately timed, year-round, no-advance-notice testing. The plan must provide for the collection of samples at the time that athletes most benefit from doping and must be flexible and responsive to evolving doping techniques. A drug testing program is ineffective if athletes know during what times of the year they will be tested or are given sufficient notice of the test to take steps to alter samples in order to avoid detection. An effective program also must be built around a comprehensive list of categories of prohibited substances and methods. One lesson reinforced by THG and the BALCO investigation, is that programs must incorporate sufficient flexibility to deal with the creation and use of “designer drugs.” Unlike workplace or drugs-of-abuse testing, the Olympic Movement list of categories of prohibited substances and methods is extensive. Therefore, the continued dedication of resources to the testing laboratories that are charged with developing and validating testing methods for this wide array of substances is an important aspect of deterrence. An effective and credible program also combines defined sanctions of sufficient magnitude to deter drug use with a fair means of imposing such sanctions. In the Olympic Movement the sanction for a first steroid offense is a two-year suspension. A second steroid offense results in a lifetime ban. Because of the severity of these sanctions, USADA’s adjudication system includes numerous protections for athletes to ensure that only athletes who are guilty of a doping violation are sanctioned. Significantly, while USADA believes the privacy rights of individuals accused of a doping violation must be respected, no individual’s right should outweigh the rights of all athletes to compete in clean sport and to be assured that those who break the rules are appropriately sanctioned. USADA also believes that to protect the rights of all athletes an anti-doping program should be transparent, by allowing for an independent review of the effectiveness and fairness of each aspect of the program. Another important component is the education of athletes as to why healthy competition is important and why taking the uninformed health risks associated with prohibited substances is a bad choice. The achievements in sport, like the achievements in life, should be the result of hard work, commitment, and dedication. We agree strongly with the President who stated in his State of the Union address that achieving success through drugs sends the message that character doesn’t count. In developing our educational materials, USADA has benefited from our interaction with Character Counts and their “Pursuing Victory with Honor” program. Reaching your goals through strength of individual character and by making the right decisions, are at the core of what USADA has emphasized in our “100% Me” program for elementary school students. Finally, an effective program must devote significant resources to research for the detection of new doping substances and techniques and the pursuit of scientific excellence in doping control. To this end, USADA has funded pioneering work in such areas as the effort to develop a test for human growth hormone. Our international symposium in 2002 took a comprehensive approach to the issue of increased oxygen transport and lead to research, the results of which are beginning to close all of the approaches to blood doping. Most recently, USADA has supported research at several laboratories regarding the newly detected designer steroid THG. USADA is also strongly committed to furthering research regarding the health risks associated with long term use of prohibited substances, including, human growth hormone. Since its inception just over three years ago, USADA has worked hard to show the world that United States Olympic Movement athletes compete clean. We believe that the USADA program contains all of the important elements of a comprehensive and effective testing program and we continue to work each day to improve our system to further protect clean athletes. Specifically, we are focused on increasing the numbers of no-advance-notice tests that we perform. We are also seeking to improve our ability to systematically identify and sanction those athletes and other individuals who are engaged in the effort to create designer substances or otherwise gain an advantage over athletes who are competing clean. USADA believes that stemming the use of drugs in sports is necessary to preserve the integrity of sport in this nation. Athletes, including America’s children who dream of athletic stardom, have a fundamental right not be put in a position where they believe that they must use drugs to effectively compete. USADA is dedicated to protecting that right and welcomes the opportunity to work with any sport that is committed to the cause of drug-free sport. We thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to share our convictions on this important national topic.