Senate Republicans Raise Concerns Over Aviation Safety Breakdowns That Led to Fatal Mid-Air Collision at DCA

March 28, 2025

Officials from FAA, Army, and NTSB address questions over NTSB Preliminary Report

WASHINGTON, D.C. – At this week’s Senate Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation hearing, titled “NTSB Preliminary Report: DCA Midair Collision,” Senate Republicans pressed officials from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Army, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on breakdowns in the aviation safety systems that potentially contributed to the deadly mid-air collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29, 2025 near the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). Senators emphasized concerns about the Army’s practice of frequently turning off ADS-B Out transmission and called for the FAA to modernize its air traffic control system.

 

Sen. Cruz Vows Investigation into Improper Counter-Drone Testing near DCA After Fatal Crash

Sen. Cruz: It's now come to my attention that these warnings were caused by the Secret Service and the U.S. Navy, improperly testing counter-drone technology at DCA. Apparently, the Navy was using the same spectrum band as TCAS, causing the interference and faulty resolution advisories, even though the FAA had previously warned the Navy and the Secret Service against using that specific spectrum band due to interference risks. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, is that correct?

Acting Administrator Rocheleau: Yes, sir, that's correct.

Sen. Cruz: Let me just say this deeply disturbing that just a month after 67 people died while on approach to DCA, that the Secret Service and Pentagon would inadvertently cause multiple flights to receive urgent cockpit alerts recommending evasive action. It is inappropriate for such testing to occur at DCA, given the facts of what occurred, and I expect this Committee to investigate why precisely that happened.

 

Sen. Cruz Gives Army 24-Hour Deadline to Provide Memo Regarding Turning Off Safety System Feature

Sen. Cruz: The Army has a memo, August 9th, 2024, entitled, ‘ADS-B Out Off Operations in the National Air Space.’ My staff requested that memo from you, and my understanding is your team declined to provide it. That is also unacceptable. I want to ask you at this hearing, will you commit to providing that memo to this Committee?

Brig. Gen. Braman: Senator, I commit to reviewing the information and getting what we can to you. Absolutely.

Sen. Cruz: That answer needs to be a yes, that you will provide that memo to this committee.

Brig. Gen. Braman: Senator, we'll review that, and we'll look at the ability to give it to the committee. Absolutely.

Sen. Cruz: If it is not provided to this Committee within 24 hours, I am confident that you will have a senior commanding officer give you a direct order to provide that Committee -- provide that memo to this Committee. And I just want to underscore, there's no reason the Army has to wait for the conclusion of the NTSB report to revisit your policy on ADS-B out. You can do so right now. And I got to tell you, I spent this morning looking in the eyes of family members who lost family members. I don't know how I would do it tomorrow to another room of family members who lost loved ones, because, yet, another helicopter was flying with ADS-B out. And so I cannot urge you more strongly, change that policy right now.

 

Sen. Moran Questions FAA’s Failure to Address Helicopter and Commercial Air Traffic Safety Risks at DCA Airport

Sen. Moran: What did the FAA know prior to this accident? When did they know it, and why wasn't something some action taken to encourage and in fact, increase its safety, particularly at an airport like DCA and maybe others, and the proximity between helicopter and commercial air service traffic?

Acting Administrator Rocheleau: Yes, sir. So, I'm very concerned about what we've learned in the subsequent investigation, both from the NTSB, as well as our own reviews that we immediately took. Clearly something was missed. I would say, immediately after the event, we took the action again, I referenced earlier with Under Secretary Duffy's leadership to restrict air traffic in that area to ensure there was no helicopter traffic, as well as fixed wing.

Sen. Moran: …What did not happen at the FAA that would have highlighted this problem earlier, when this at the time in which this information is acquired by the FAA, but apparently not looked at until the accident?

Acting Administrator Rocheleau: …there's an ongoing review all the time of the data that is available. As the Chair mentioned there's millions of pieces of data that come in, and I would tell you that we have verified every single near midair collision was investigated, but there were certainly those instances where the information itself was not identified, and that's why we would put artificial intelligence and machine learning in place now to ensure that we're able to go through millions and tens of millions of pieces of data to identify those trends and act quickly to mitigate those risks.

Sen. Moran: There's no question, had this information been utilized by the FAA or others that steps could have been taken to make certain that flying, particularly again, in the circumstance of helicopters and commercial aviation at a place like Reagan National Airport. It would have been an opportunity to do something had that information actually been known and acted on.

 

NTSB Chairman Homendy Reveals Helicopter Involved in Crash Hadn't Transmitted ADS-B Data for 730 Days

Sen. Moran:  Since the report that we're discussing here today is two weeks old, what has transpired, if anything, in those two weeks? Have you discovered any new and relevant information that you could share with us?

Chairman Homendy: One thing I can say on ADS-B Out, Off, that's policy of the Army, but we are also look -- we are still looking at installation programming and potential for equipment malfunction. And the reason I mention this is because the accident helicopter know -- for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days prior to the accident, and that was abnormal. So, we began looking at the fleet for the battalion. The battalion had 25 helicopters. That includes this particular helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models, and all were transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned on, because we have to verify that it's working. There were 16 Limas, including the accident helicopter, which we're still looking at, but seven were transmitting when ADS-B Out was turned on; eight were not. And stopped doing so sometime between May and November 2023, we don't know why. Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the reason. So, I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out on, but you also have to make sure that it's working.

 

FAA Admits Awareness of Airspace Design Issues Near DCA Before Crash in Response to Sen. Budd

Sen. Budd: … the Aviation Investigation Report from the NTSB shows that the separation between an aircraft on approach to Runway 33 would have a mere 75 feet of separation from a helicopter operating on Route 4 and hugging the shoreline of the East Bank of the Potomac. Was the FAA aware of this conflict prior to January 29th? And given the insufficient vertical separation that we're talking about, was the FAA relying solely on controllers in the DCA tower to de-conflict the approach to Runway 33?

Acting Administrator Rocheleau: So, the FAA was aware of the design of that airspace in advance of [January] 29th. I would say that's one of the reasons why we immediately restricted that airspace after the incident to review the circumstances around the airspace itself. In addition to that, it's one of the reasons why we are looking at hotspots or mixed-traffic areas around the nation, whether that's Boston, Dallas, L.A., and Anchorage.

Chairman Homendy: There is a D.C. helicopter working group that we have been trying to figure out who is part of the working group and get minutes and get documents from that working group to see what information was shared and what was discussed over the years. We have not been able to attain that yet, and I hope we can from FAA and others.

Sen. Budd:  Are you a part of that working group?

Chairman Homendy:  We are not part of that working group.

Sen. Budd:  But you have access to it and their willingness -- they are willing to provide what they find?

Chairman Homendy: We have requested information. We have not even been able to identify who is part of the working group firmly and get documents as part of that working group. We've requested all of that information because we do want to evaluate what was discussed. We're also going to interview the FAA cartographers on how this route was mapped, because that 75 feet is max, that is the maximum. It goes down from there as the glide slope comes down to -- as commercial aircraft approach Runway 33.

###